We propose a theoretical framework that addresses three key features of insurgent rhetoric: (1) ideologies as represented by "conflict frames," which consist of the in-groups and out-groups in insurgent discourse (2) operational claims of attacks and (3) publicly declared tactical cooperation with other insurgent groups. The main fault line in the Taliban’s relationship with its various allies appears to be centred on power and authority, rather than ideological disagreement.Īlthough the fundamental importance of the political dimension of insurgencies is widely accepted, there has been little effort to develop a dedicated theory of what is the most central political observable of insurgents-their rhetoric. In spite of their common goals (ending foreign occupation of Afghanistan and establishing an Islamic state), their relationship can be described as pragmatic at best. Still, the Taliban appears to have a closer relationship with its foreign allies than with the other major insurgent leader in Afghanistan, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The Taliban’s agenda differs from that of its foreign allies (al-Qaida, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and others) because its primary concern is fighting for Islam within the context of Afghanistan’s borders, while the foreign groups aim to spread their fight to other countries as well. The report argues that the Taliban sees itself as a nationalist-religious movement, which fights mainly to resurrect the Taliban regime of the 1990s and to bring the various ethnic groups of Afghanistan under its rule. The third and most extensive part of the report analyses the Taliban leadership’s ideology and worldview, based on the official statements of its organization and leaders. The second part looks at the organizational characteristics of the largest and most well-known insurgent group in Afghanistan: the Taliban movement (or Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, IEA) led by Mullah Omar. The approach to this is three-fold: First, the report discusses the nature of the Afghan insurgency as described in existing literature. The aim of this report is to get a better understanding of the Taliban movement and its role in the Afghan insurgency post-2001.
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